NARVA. Two medieval fortresses, Hermannsburg (left) and Ivangorod (right), flank the Narva River.
Narva: Castles/Crossing/Town
Background to a
Battle
The German army of 1944 was no longer the seemingly
invincible military force that had conquered most of Europe in the first years
of World War II. In the previous year, the Red Army had pushed the German Army
Group Center back over 400 miles, from Voronezh to Kiev. Another 400 miles had
been lost by Army Group South when the Soviets forced it to abandon the rich
lands between the Don and Dniepr Rivers. The only relatively static German
front was in Army Group North's sector.
There the siege of Leningrad was in its 28th month. Apart
from occasional probing attacks, the Germans were content to shell the city
with artillery and maintain patrolling along the perimeter. Overall, it had
become a quiet sector. However, Josef Stalin and the Soviet High Command (STAVKA)
were planning a series of hammer blows designed to break that siege and
eventually move the Red Army to the frontiers of Germany itself.
In the opening weeks of January, two Soviet Fronts (army
groups) prepared massive assaults. Gen. LA. Govorov's Leningrad Front was to
strike out from the city with the 42nd and 67th Armies, while the 2nd Shock
Army attacked from the Oranienbaum pocket.
Gen. Kiril A. Meretskov's Volkhov Front was to hit the enemy
with another three armies; the 8th at Mga, the 54th on the Volkhov River, and
the 59th around Novgorod. Between those two fronts, the Soviets hoped the
entire German 18th Army would be enveloped in a Stalingrad like pocket offering
no hope of escape. They were confident the superiority they had in arms and men
would smash the Germans.
On the other side, Adolf Hitler was not worried about the
position of Army Group North. In fact, on 28 December 1943, while looking for
units to strengthen the battered corps of his other east front armies, he told
his army chief of staff, Gen. Zeitzler, "Even now we can get 12 divisions
out of Army Group North" to send elsewhere. He ordered plans made to start
transferring the first of those divisions in early January.
Hitler may have had confidence in the army group's defences,
but the commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Georg von Küchler, was not
as certain. He felt his 16th and 18th Armies could ill afford to lose the units
being taken from them. Even before the withdrawals, there were not enough
combat troops to properly man the positions.
A secondary line, known as the "Panther" position,
had been under construction since the fall of 1943. It ran from the Gulf of
Finland, along the Narva River and Lake Peipus, south through Pskov and beyond
Vitebsk. This was to be the fall back position in case the army group was
forced to retreat. Hitler's plan for depleting von Küchler's forces would,
however, stretch the defenders to the absolute limit. The stage was thus being
set for a possible major disaster.
The Offensive Begins
On the night of 13/14 January, the Soviet attack began. From
the Oranienbaum pocket, over 100,000 shells fell upon the divisions of the3rd
SS Panzer Corps, while the Leningrad Front attacked with 42 infantry divisions
and 9 tank corps. The SS Corps was composed of the 9th and 10th Luftwaffe Field
Divisions, the 11th SS "Nordland" Division, and the 4th SS
"Nederland" Brigade.
The first German unit to be caught in the Soviet onslaught
was the 10th Luftwaffe Field Division. It instantly fell apart, leaving a gap
through which the Reds poured with tanks and infantry. The 9th Luftwaffe fared
no better. Two days later, the commander of 18th Army , Gen. Georg Lindemann,
was forced to use his only reserve, the 61st Infantry Division, to try to plug
the gap left by the shattered Luftwaffe units.
The next morning, Govorov's artillery unleashed a barrage
that dropped over 220,000 shells on the German 50th Corps in front of
Leningrad. Gen. Masslenikov's 42nd Army then overran the German defenses, and
by the end of the day achieved a penetration of 2.6 kilometers.
Meanwhile, Meretskov's Volkhov Front assaulted the Germans
at Lake Ilmen. It was clear to von Küchler the Communists had opened a major
offensive, but bad weather on the 15th worked to restore some of his
confidence, since the Red Air Force became temporarily grounded. Further, some
reinforcements were made available to the army group and the movement of
divisions to other fronts was halted. The German command was temporarily under
the impression their forces could hold the present positions and cut off the
Soviet penetrations into their lines. The next day, though, the Russian skies
had cleared and the might of Soviet air power was again felt along the entire
front.
Under the protective cover of their airpower, Soviet forces
pushing out of the Oranienbaum pocket raced to meet the Leningrad units. There
seemed to be no way for the German units on the coast to escape. The men of
Gen. Steiner's 3rd SS Panzer Corps were driven to ground by the Soviet artillery
and the guns of the Baltic Fleet. Scattered pockets of resistance held the
attackers in some places, but Soviet armor and air superiority made the overall
situation hopeless.
Heroes on Both Sides
The Soviets had learned their lessons well from their German
teachers, and their soldiers had adapted the principles of the Blitzkrieg to
their own kind of fighting. In the first two weeks of the offensive, 12 Red
Army officers and enlisted men won the coveted title, "Hero of the Soviet
Union." For example, 2nd Lt. Volkov of the 131st Guards Regiment, Sgt.
Skuridin of the 98th Infantry Division, A.F. Tipanov, of the 64th Guards
Infantry Division and Pvt. I.N. Kulikov gave their lives by blocking the slits
of German pillboxes with their bodies, allowing their comrades to successfully
attack the positions. Sgt. Morozov, of the 90th Infantry Division repulsed a
German counterattack, even though his comrades were all dead and he was badly
wounded.
The Germans had their heroes, too. Maj. Fritz Bunse,
commander of the 11th SS Engineer Battalion, and Lt. Col. Hanns Heinrich
Lohmann, commander of the 3rd Bn./ "Norge" Regiment of the 11th SS
Division, both received the Knight's Cross for leading their units in
successful, though ultimately futile, holding actions. On 16 January, 2nd Lt.
Georg Langendorf's 5th Company of the 11th SS Reconnaissance Detachment met a
Soviet column of 54 tanks. With only six anti-tank guns, Langendorf’s company
destroyed 48 of the enemy vehicles and forced the others to retreat.
The Retreat Begins
Despite their high casualties, the Soviets were more than
able to make good their losses with reserve troops. By 18 January, von Küchler
reported to Hitler his entire line from Leningrad to Novgorod was collapsing.
The Soviet 58th Rifle Brigade had crossed the ice of Lake Ilmen and broken
through German positions south of Novgorod. Troops of the 2nd Shock and 42nd
Armies had linked up at Ropscha, and the German units on the coast could be
written off.
Von Küchler gave orders for his 26th Corps to withdraw
almost 20 miles to new defensive positions. But Hitler took his usual
"hold or die" attitude and forbade the movement of the corps, though
his will alone was no longer enough to stop the Soviets. At any rate, the order
for withdrawal had already been implemented, and it was too late to countermand
the retreat. After almost 900 days, the siege of Leningrad had been broken.
While Hitler and von Küchler argued over the retreat of one
corps, Army Group North's lines were being shattered everywhere. Partisan units
attacked supply columns and destroyed rail lines and bridges. Many German divisions were down to regimental strength, and
regiments had worn away to company size. For example, on 19 January, the 503rd
Grenadier Regiment of the 290th Infantry Division reported a strength of only 3
officers and100 men.
By 24 January, units of the Soviet 42nd Army had reached
Krasnogvardeysk and were heading for the Luga River. Von Küchler had no choice
but to order a full retreat to the Luga in the hope his troops could hold
there. But again, Hitler rejected the proposed withdrawal and von Küchler was
forced to appear before him personally to plead his case. He told Hitler the
18th Army had already suffered 40,000 casualties and only a fraction of those
had been replaced, but the Führer remained firm in his demand for no retreat.
The dictator had lost all confidence in von Küchler and was already looking for
a replacement; but events on the northern front would wait for no man not even
Hitler.
By the 30th, the situation had become even more desperate
for the Germans. Soviet forces continued their advance under the protection of
the Red Air Force. Their tank and motorized units fanned out and spread havoc
in the German rear areas. Once more von Küchler appealed to Hitler for
permission to retreat. Though it was already too late for some of his units,
the Field Marshal also knew any further delay could cost him his entire
command.
The advancing red lines on the map finally convinced Hitler
18th Army had to withdraw to the Luga River line, but he had delayed that
decision for too long. Enemy spearheads had already crossed the river north of
the town of Luga. A day later, Hitler relieved von Küchler of command and
replaced him with Gen. Walter Model.
Model was a strong defensive tactician and a favorite of the
Führer. He issued his first order, which of course merely echoed the wishes of
the supreme commander:
"Not a single step backward will be taken without my
express permission." That attitude, along with having Hitler's confidence,
allowed Model to exercise a greater degree of independence than his
predecessor. Model, too, soon realized the Luga line could not be held, so he
carefully formulated a plan of defense that would bring his troops back to the
Panther Line step by step.
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