In all this it is useful to recall that three-quarters of
all Wehrmacht soldiers who were killed in World War II lost their lives on the
Eastern Front. Compared to that, the Western one was almost a picnic. Until the
autumn of 1942 the German Army and the Luftwaffe units supporting it, though
weakened to the point where they were no longer able to attack all along it as
they had done during the previous year, still enjoyed superiority over the
Soviets. The outcome was a series of spectacular victories that brought it to
Stalingrad and to the gates of the Caucasus. While the quality of Soviet
aircraft was improving, German pilots and organization, including above all the
critically important field of communications, remained superior. Concentrating
its forces, the Luftwaffe was still able to obtain clear air superiority at the
time and at the place it wanted. The problem was that, given the relatively low
number of machines and the huge spaces to be overrun, there were never enough
forces to do a really thorough job. This was reflected in the tremendous effort
of the Luftwaffe transport command; during this period it flew 21,500 sorties,
covered over ten million miles, and delivered 42,000–43,000 tons of supplies.
Determined to dislodge the last remaining Soviet forces
still clinging to the right bank of the Volga at Stalingrad, in October the
Luftwaffe concentrated 80 percent of all its combat power against that city.
During that month the bombers and dive-bombers of Luftflotte 4 flew
approximately 20,000 bomber and dive-bomber sorties to assist General Friedrich
Paulus’s Sixth Army. Targets consisted of remaining pockets of resistance as
well as Soviet traffic across the river. However, the Germans did not have a
free hand. As enemy resistance stiffened, the number of serviceable machines
dropped by almost half. By the time the Soviet counteroffensive got under way
on November 20, the Red Air Force, constantly growing in numbers and operating
from bases east of the Volga, was in control of the sky. Particularly important
was the German pilots’ inability, made worse by the closeness of the fighting
on the ground, to identify their targets at night. For just that reason, it was
at night that the Soviets sent most of their reinforcements into the
beleaguered city.
The Soviet counteroffensive quickly led to the encirclement
of the German Sixth Army. Some months earlier, in February–May 1942, about
90,000 German troops had been cut off by the Red Army, forming two pockets
south of Leningrad. During that period the Luftwaffe was able to keep the encircled
forces alive by flying in supplies and replacement troops and taking out the
wounded. In the end the encircled formations were able to break the siege,
although doing so cost them much of their heavy equipment. Now Goering told
Hitler that the Luftwaffe might repeat the performance. Yet conditions were
entirely different. Whereas the battle for Demyansk took place toward the
beginning of spring so that the weather could be expected to improve, that for
Stalingrad got under way just when winter was setting in. Whereas the troops at
Demyansk needed a minimum of 265 tons a day to survive, the 220,000 at
Stalingrad needed at least twice as much. Flying in and out of the city, the
distances the aircraft had to cover were also much longer.
Mobilizing every aircraft and every crew, braving nights
that were becoming increasingly longer, atrocious weather conditions, and
growing Soviet resistance in the air and from the ground, the Luftwaffe, still
flying mostly obsolescent Ju-52s, did what it could. However, during the entire
period when the air-bridge was in operation only once did it succeed in
delivering as much as 280 tons, whereas the daily average stood at a mere 90
tons. Toward the end, as more and more airfields were lost to the advancing
Soviet columns, the Germans were reduced to dropping supplies by parachute,
with the result that many were lost or fell into enemy hands. None of this
could save the doomed Sixth Army; by the time it surrendered, the Luftwaffe’s
transport command, having lost almost 500 aircraft and many experienced crews,
had received a blow from which it would never recover.
The last occasion when the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front
was able to intervene effectively in the ground battle was at Kursk in July
1943, when it saved the German Ninth Army from encirclement and possibly
annihilation. From this point on, in the air as on the ground, the boot was
clearly on the other foot. Already during 1942 the quality of Soviet airpower
had begun to improve; aircraft received wireless—from early 1943 on, every new
machine was equipped with a set—and modern navigation aids. Soviet ground radar
had now developed to the point where it was able to provide 15 minutes’ advance
warning against approaching German aircraft, greatly facilitating interception
and enabling commanders to do away with the wasteful practice of mounting air
patrols around the clock. Stalin’s Falcons finally got around to adopting the
staggered four-finger formation, the outcome being a notable improvement in the
scores of air-to-air combat.
By this time the Soviet aviation industry, much of which had
been hastily evacuated to the territory east of the Ural Mountains in 1941, was
back in full operation. Partly for that reason, partly because of the
Luftwaffe’s decision to focus on the defense of the Reich, the Red Air Force
also enjoyed a very great quantitative advantage. One result was that the
number of air-to-air encounters actually declined, as was later to happen in
the west too; there simply were no German planes or pilots left to carry on the
fight.
This in turn meant that the Soviets, assured of air
superiority at most times and places, were able to focus on air-to-ground
attack. Like their enemies and their allies, they developed a system of forward
air observers. They were fully motorized and used radio telephony to work with
ground commanders down to the regimental level. Tactics, too, improved. At Stalingrad,
deficient arrangements for air-to-ground cooperation made Soviet air support
almost totally ineffective. Now, with the battle moving to and fro (but mostly
to) over the enormous, almost featureless expanses, things became a lot easier.
Smaller, more flexible formations numbering three or four aircraft were
adopted. Pilots learned to launch their attacks from the west, especially
during the late afternoon when the sun would blind the German defenders. While
tactical bombers—the only ones the Soviets had—fighter-bombers, and ground
attack aircraft flew both battlefield support and interdiction sorties, the
Soviets continued to differ from the western Allies in that they always
preferred the former to any other kind. By one calculation they devoted as many
as 40–50 percent of all sorties to that task. This was almost as many as those
devoted to air superiority (35–45 percent), interdiction (4–12 percent), and
reconnaissance (2–13 percent) combined.
The number of Soviet combat aircraft grew from 1,327 at
Stalingrad to no fewer than 7,496 during the climactic Battle of Berlin. The
daily number of sorties went up from 500 at Stalingrad to 2,600 at Kursk to
4,157 at Berlin. Whereas at Stalingrad each aircraft flew 0.37 sorties per day
on the average, two years later the figure stood at 0.55. Losses were heavy in proportion.
Out of 33,700 ground-attack aircraft built, no fewer than 23,600, or 70
percent, were destroyed—12,400 by enemy action and 11,200 by accidents of every
kind. All this fits in well with a report that, soon after the war, Stalin was
shocked to learn that fully 47 percent of all losses had been due to accidents.
As so often was the case, the discovery immediately led to an investigation
into the nefarious activities of assorted so-called wreckers and enemies,
though its results are not recorded. Yet in one respe ct the Soviets were
fortunate. Given that almost all their aircraft were single- or twin-seaters,
personnel losses were proportionally much smaller than those suffered by the
western Allies in particular; in the long run, smaller losses translated into
greater accumulated experience.
As so often was the case, just how much Soviet airpower
affected ground operations is impossible to say. To be sure, we are told that
“air cover and support from the tank armies that carried the burden of the
major Soviet offensives after 1944 were critical to the overall success” and
that “the [Frontal Air Force] was the most mobile, flexible, and powerful means
for supporting tank armies during deep operations.” However, the question
remains as to how critical “critical” really was. Whereas German records and
memoirs pertaining to the West often stress the role of Allied airpower, when
it comes to the Red Air Force they are of little help. To the very end, the
German generals tended to look down on their Soviet enemies, attributing the
latter’s victories, and their own defeats, to hammer-like blows delivered by
overwhelming numbers rather than to any tactical and operational finesse.
Always it was the supply system that broke down, or some neighboring unit that
gave way, rather than they themselves who were defeated. For most of these
generals, admitting that Soviet successes in the war in general, and in the air
war in particular, might be due to qualitative superiority was little but
heresy; during the Cold War, such an admission would cast doubt on Germany’s
usefulness to its newly found NATO allies.
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