Ost 1942 Command Failure

At senior command level, trends at OKW and OKH ran counter to those at STAVKA. Where Stalin began to appreciate the limitations of his military expertise, Hitler, from an initial position of mere arbiter of strategy, became increasingly involved in tactical decision-making. From his order of December 1941 for Army Group Centre to stand fast, and his decision to dismiss `defeatist' commanders, he concluded that he above all had the wisdom and the will to force a final victory. From his decision that II Corps should hold fast at Demyansk, and the subsequent successful defence of the pocket, he concluded that large formations of encircled German troops could be adequately supplied by the Luftwaffe while continuing to pose a significant threat to the enemy rear. After the resignation of Brauchitsch on 19 December 1941 Hitler assumed the post of Commander in Chief OKH thereby eliminating the army's last vestige of service independence. Thereafter he began to appoint politically loyal generals to senior command positions, and increasingly he began to micromanage combat operations. In doing so he undermined one of the strengths of the German army, the delegated authority of commanders on the battlefield to make independent command decisions and their ability to respond flexibly to changes in operational circumstances. 

Having anticipated a conflict of around eight weeks duration, prior to 1942 there had been little planning by the German High Command for a prolonged conflict. Weapon development projects during 1941 had been scaled back or cancelled and virtually no preparation had been made for the possibility of the conflict continuing into the depths of a Russian winter. Yet having faced a larger, better-equipped and more resilient foe than it had anticipated, as the winter of 1941 approached OKH found that it was facing an enemy whose morale was still unbroken, that was, unlike the Ostheer, fully equipped for winter fighting, and that was adapting its tactics in light of bitter experience. An example of evolving Soviet tactics was the clash that took place between Eberbach's 5 Pz Bgd and Katukov's 4 Tank Bgd southwest of Mtsensk in October 1941. Katukov concentrated his force and used advantages of surprise, terrain and armament range to good effect. Clashes of this sort prompted the Wehrmacht to revive pre-war plans for the development of a heavy tank, and for the development of a new medium tank that could emulate the combat capability of the T34. Until such new weapons could be both developed and produced in quantity, the Ostheer would be left to fight using tanks designed in the 1930s. 

Fortunately for Germany, in the PzKpfw Mk IV it had a machine that was capable of extensive development in its power train, its armament and its armour. During its development the Mk IV became the backbone of the panzer forces, and for a time gave the Ostheer a renewed qualitative edge. The Mk III was too small and too light for such major upgrading, but there remained an urgent requirement for thicker armour and an improved gun. The most immediate improvement to the Mk III and the Mk IV was a doubling of their armour protection through the fitting of face-hardened spaced plates, and the acceptance of a consequent reduction in their mobility. The Mk IV was up gunned through the replacement of its short-barrelled 7.5cm infantry support weapon with a highly effective 43-calibre variant of the new 7.5cm anti-tank gun. The Mk III was not capable of taking the 7.5cm anti-tank gun, but its armament was improved somewhat by the replacement of its 42-calibre 5cm gun with a variant of the long-barrelled (60-calibre) 5cm Pak 38 (L/60) anti-tank gun that was being issued to the infantry. The deficiencies of the infantry's standard 3.7cm anti-tank gun had been recognised since 1940. Though light and manoeuvrable, it was almost useless in dealing with the T34 and KV1 and was a factor in the rout of 112 Inf Div by part of 32 Tank Bgd supported by 239 Rifle Div southeast of Tula in November 1941. In response, the process, begun in 1940, of replacing the infantry's 3.7cm gun with the Pak 38 (L/60) was accelerated. Also available was a variant of the 7.5cm anti-tank gun developed for infantry use (the Pak 40). Although the 7.5cm was an effective weapon it was too heavy to be manoeuvred manually and had to be towed into position by motorised transport, severely limiting its operational flexibility. The highly effective 8.8cm dual-purpose anti-aircraft and anti-tank gun was even more unwieldy, and at 4.4 tonnes was nearly ten times the weight of the early 3.7cm gun. In 1940 the Wehrmacht had begun the development of the self-propelled gun, a turretless armoured fighting vehicle based on the chassis of a tank with a gun fitted to a fixed casement. Such weapons generally had a lower profile than a tank, were easier and cheaper to manufacture and, depending on their configuration, could be used as mobile indirect fire artillery, as direct fire infantry support weapons, or as `tank-killers'. In the direct fire infantry support assault gun role, Germany developed in 1940 the StuG III based on the PzKpfw Mk III chassis and armed with the short-barrelled 7.5cm infantry support gun. In the same year the Panzerjäger I, the first `tank-killer' self-propelled gun, was developed based on the PzKpfw Mk I tank chassis and armed with a 4.7cm Pak(t) gun. These weapons were the first of a range of increasingly powerful self-propelled guns developed by Germany during the course of the war. 

The main weapons of the German artillery arm were developed in the early 1930s. At regimental level, two infantry support guns predominated - the short-barrelled 7.5cm leIG18 and the somewhat cumbersome 15cm sIG33. At divisional level, artillery support was based primarily on the 10.5cm sK18 field gun, the 10.5cm leFH18 howitzer and the 15cm sFH18 heavy howitzer. In the early period of the war these artillery pieces, used in conjunction with the German army's efficient and effective fire control system, proved to be eminently fit for purpose, and they were subject to little further development. The leFH18 was upgraded in 1941 to achieve a modest increase in range, and to improve the range of the sFH18, the ammunition for the gun was modified to provide a rocket propulsion element to the shell's propellant system. The German army had a range of larger calibre artillery pieces (15cm and above), and significant use was made of captured guns, but the mainstay of the artillery arm remained the regimental and divisional artillery weapons with which Germany went to war in 1939. 

As a means of countering the improved armour protection of tanks, in conjunction with the introduction of faster and heavier anti-tank projectiles, considerable development went into the design of the projectiles. The first improvement from the simple solid shot was the addition of a softer metallic cap to prevent the break-up of the armour penetrating component on impact. Further improvements were achieved by the use of tungsten carbide in the main shot, and the streamlining of the shot to achieve higher muzzle velocities by the fitting of a ballistic cap to the impact cap. Such developments were pursued by both sides during the early period of the war and the result of this work had a considerable impact on force structure and tactics as the war progressed. 

In the air, both sides strove to improve the performance of their aircraft, neither side gaining a distinct technological advantage. The Red Army took some time to recover from the devastating aircraft losses of the first few days of the war, but in a combat zone as large as the Eastern Front neither side would ever achieve true air superiority. All that could be achieved was local and often merely temporary advantage on a particular strategic axis.

Panther Brigade 10 at Kursk - Redux

There was a huge catfight after Kursk as to Pz Brig 10's notable lack of success. Everyone was screaming about how the Panthers hadn't worked. Decker[1] blamed Strachwitz's tactics, because his own rear end was very much on the line. Decker was not with his unit from 7-11 July, being called to account to Knobelsdorff (XXXXVII Pzkps) for the brigade staff's lack of effectiveness, and thus had a fine opportunity to blame Strachwitz and Hoernlein for all the problems. His letter drips self-justification, conveniently ignoring a few facts, such as the loss of about 150 of the 200 Panthers in the attacks on 5-6 July, when Decker was in command. Most of the confusion regarding terrain, Pakfronts and minefields resulted from the Panther units having arrived at the last minute and conducted no reconnaissance, many of their officers' inexperience, and radio equipment deficiencies. The "idiocy" of Strachwitz's tactics also may be judged by the fact that at the end of 6 July, Pz Rgt GD, which had been out front both days, had suffered far fewer losses than had Pz Brig 10. The reality was that GD with Pz Brig 10 attached undertook its mission exactly in accordance with its orders and current Panzer doctrine. The sad fact was that the panzerwaffe had never encountered a defense in depth of the sort found in the Korps AO. Doctrine until then had called for slashing tactics, ignoring flanks. The changes to doctrine reflected lessons learned generally, not any fault in Pz Rgt GD. Of course, doctrine for offensive operations of the Kursk sort wasn't used much thereafter. Strachwitz was very much the aristocrat and could be forbidding to deal with. He also remained adept at aggressive Panzer tactics, leading to his repeated tasking to pocket-relief missions until the war's end. Anyone wondering just how widely he was regarded as "idiotic" should search (in vain) for other criticism of him like Decker's, and consider his and his critic's respective career paths after Kursk. The confusion that's arisen over this question is just another example of the deficiencies inherent in Jentz's approach in Panzertruppen. Apparently uncomfortable with his analytical abilities, he declines any analysis whatsoever. This would not present so many problems if he weren't so selective in the primary sources he quotes and paraphrases, and if his readers generally were a little more historiographically sophisticated. By the way, I found the Decker letter at p 96 of Panzertruppen 2, and the info on Pz Brig 10's late arrival and the losses on 5-6 July are at pp 114 et seq of Jung's Pzrgt GD book.

Both abteilungen [battalions] abtn retained a cadre or kernel of very experienced crews. However, they were filled out with inexperienced people, many with no panzer experience at all, and were subject to some personnel "raiding" during their long sojourn in Germany during the Panther teething period. Officer quality in the two abtn was very uneven. Because the brigade's Panthers only were shipped at the eleventh hour, many of the crews had very slim experience with the new vehicle; bear in mind that a minimal number of Panthers had been issued for training, and they all experienced very high downtime from teething problems. More important, perhaps, there had been very little work at zug [platoon] level and none on a larger scale. Many of the abtn personnel arrived in the kampfraum only a day or so before the offensive began; the brigade staff showed up even later. Thus there was very little of the usual foot recon, signals testing, etc. that doctrine stated should precede a deliberate attack. While a veteran unit might have improved on the brig's performance in the almost-hasty attack circumstances faced on 5-7 July, and veteran crews doubtless maneuverered and fought well, subject to mechanical problems and the unexpected defenses, the brigade as a whole charitably could be said to have been still shaking down at Kursk. It would be interesting to know how the brig's performance improved over the campaign. Presumably experienced crews made fewer disabling errors (a major reason for engine failure was said to be inexperienced driving, and presumably green crews made more tactical mistakes and paid for them); I wonder to what extent veteran crews that lost their rides ranked others out of their panzers. These two factors likely shrank the brig into a much smaller but more effective unit. The brigade's problems in training, equipping and transport, and the resulting difficulties in their first engagements, are recounted in Jentz and in the Spaeter and Jung GD books ( I recall that Feist and some other secondary published sources selectively synopsize the information.) Of course, it's necessary to read with the filters on, as all the first-hand reports were written to assign or deflect blame for the brigade's problems, but many assertions appear factual and unequivocal, and rough triangulation towards an assessment is possible.

There were a three instances of German Panzer brigades getting thrashed in Lorraine in the fall of 1944. And the typical cry of "Jabos" doesn't begin to explain what happened. The Germans were outmaneuvered and outfought, twice by American troops of Patton's army; and in the third instance by the French 2nd AD.

In these three instances the common denominator was the lack of experience of the Panzer troops. This charge can even be made against their senior leadership -- for while they were experts in armored warfare on the eastern front, they were ill-prepared to fight on the western front of 1944.

Certainly tanks were abandoned by their crews during these fights and certainly some of these were cases of panic. But, a small set of instances like these is hardly justification to intimate on a broad scale that Heer panzer crews were cowardly or untrained. All the actions in this case prove is that less well trained and experienced troops will generally not do well against a better trained and experienced enemy. This was proved again in January 1945, when the shoe was on the other foot, and it was the green U.S. 12th Armored Division learning harsh lessons in and around Herrlisheim.

[1]Lauchert lead the 39th Panzer Regiment (the Panthers). Decker lead the 10th Panzer Brigade, which was supposed to consist of the 39th Panzer Regiment and the Gross Deutschland Panzer Regiment. This arrangement lasted for two days in combat (5th and 6th), before Decker was relieved and command of these two regiments were placed under command of the GD Panzer Regiment commander (von Strachwitz). After von Strachwitz was injured on the 10th, Decker took back over command of the two regiments.

Comrade Zhukov

After Leningrad stabilized, Zhukov was sent to the Reserve Front on 8 October 1941. At that time, the USSR's situation was critical: the Battle of Moscow was taking place, and nearly the entire Soviet Western Front was being encircled in what eventually became a huge "cauldron battle" at in the Rzhev–Vyazma salient, where it was estimated that some 775,000 Soviet personnel were lost. Its commander, S. M. Budyonny, wasn't even present at headquarters and the officers in the High Command didn't seem to know what was happening at the front. An enraged Zhukov was thus forced to go to the front lines himself to grasp the battlefield situation, and then to search for Budyonny. To unify the operations of the huge numbers of Soviet forces, he sent a suggestion to Stalin that the Reserve and the Western Fronts be merged. After that, Zhukov became the de facto leader of the forces defending the Soviet capital city.

After a brief period, Zhukov established communication links with the encircled Soviet troops of the Western Front. After analyzing the situation and pointing out strengths and weaknesses of the German troops surrounding them, he gave specific instructions to their commanders and political personnel. Unable to break the Kessel (Ger. "kettle", or encirclement area), the surrounded Soviet troops did manage to strengthen their positions under Zhukov's leadership. Their efforts to some extent wore out some German units and thereby reduced the overall striking power of the offensive.

On 15 November, the Germans launched another attack on Moscow. At Krasnaya Polyana and Kryukovo, northwest of the capital, the Germans advanced to about 20 km from Moscow. Zhukov recognized an important error in the German plan—while the German forces seemed to attack aggressively from both their flanks, those in the center remained relatively inactive. From this observation, Zhukov made a rather daring decision: he ordered the repositioning of many of his centrally-located battle forces to reinforce his two flanks. With this tactical change, the Soviets stopped several German attacks with few losses among their reserve troops. Later on, these better-rested reserve forces played an important role in the counteroffensive.

Zhukov reasoned that the Germans would realize that this tactical scheme was problematic and would begin to attack in the now-weakened center. Zhukov therefore ordered the remaining forces in the center to prepare for an offensive. Just as he had predicted, the Germans began to attack the central sector troops. The Soviet preparations, however, managed to stop the German offensive.

After intense fighting, Moscow remained under Soviet control, while the German forces were exhausted and had lost equipment and supplies, a critical weakness given the long logistical tail. Although the Soviet combat forces were in no way superior compared to their German foes, Zhukov decided to launch his counteroffensive. On 1 December Zhukov was coordinating the Western, Bryansk, and the Kalinin Fronts preparatory to the counteroffensive. On 6 December the Soviet forces began a massive assault. After two months of bloody and brutal fighting, the Soviets pushed their German foes between 100 and 250 km away from Moscow—in some areas, up to 400 km—and had taken approximately 582,000 German soldiers out of action. This battle was the first time up to that point in World War II that the German army had been defeated in a large-scale battle involving millions of soldiers.

Ultimately, Operation Barbarossa failed. Perhaps most importantly, the great Soviet stand, counterattack, and ultimate victory at Moscow convinced the Allies that they could win. Zhukov received widespread accolades as the "savior of Moscow". Even Stalin heaped praise on Zhukov:

    The Motherland and the Party will never forget the action of the Soviet commanders in the Great Patriotic War. The names of the victorious generals who saved the Motherland will forever be engraved in the honorary steles placed at the battlefields. Amongst these battlefields, there is one battlefield with exceptional meanings, and that is the great one at Moscow. And the name of Comrade Zhukov, as a symbol of victory, will never be apart from this battlefield.

    —I.V. Stalin

Soviet Armour

Soviet armor was plentiful before the German invasion on June 22, 1941, but varied greatly in quality. The 11-ton T-26 was the most numerous Soviet tank when the war broke out. T-60s weighed 6.4 tons, had a crew of two, and mounted a 20 mm gun. They were the Red Army scout tank 

equivalent of the Italian L3/35 tankette. The 10- ton T-70 was still rolling off the line in 1942. It was a death trap for its two-man crew when facing Panzers or anti-tank guns. Yet, with the main medium and heavy tank factories lost at Kharkov and surrounded at Leningrad, a critical decision was made to concentrate on producing T-60s in automobile plants while fevered completion of new tank factories was underway, notably at Chelyabinsk (“Tankograd”). Chelyabinsk became the main manufacturing center of the superb T-34 medium battle tank, the mainstay of Soviet tank armies by mid-1942. The 1940 model weighed 28.5 tons while mounting a powerful 76 mm gun. Its four-man crew could attain a battle speed of 34 mph, faster than any Panzer. The 1943 model was nearly six tons heavier; the extra weight came from additional armor. The 1943 T-34 was turned out at the extraordinary rate of 1,200 per month. The T-34-85 did not add much weight. Its great advance over earlier models was its 85 mm high velocity gun, which could smash the heaviest Panzers. Its turret was also enlarged and modified, providing better sighting and gun handling. Even with the extra weight it still attained a top speed of 34 mph. About 11,000 were built in 1944 and 18,500 in 1945. The T-44 was comparable to the T-34, but with thicker armor (3.5 inches frontal).

Alongside T-26s, T-60s, and the first T-34s, the Red Army deployed the KV-1 in 1941. Named for Kliment Voroshilov, it weighed 53 tons. It outmatched the armored protection and weight of shell of German Panzer IIIs and IVs, could withstand multiple hits, and mounted a powerful 76 mm gun of its own. Protection and firepower made up for a slow, 22 mph top speed. The KV-1 so impressed the Wehrmacht that German tank designers modeled the Panther and Tiger types on it. The Soviets introduced a new series of heavy tanks late in the war. The KV-2 weighed 57 tons and mounted a 152 mm howitzer. Capable of just 16 mph and with insufficient frontal armor, it proved highly vulnerable. The 1943 KV-5 was a 50-ton tank with an 85 mm gun. The “Joseph Stalin,” or JS II, was a variation of the KV line under a new name. It weighed over 50 tons and had a top speed of 23 mph. It mounted a 122 mm gun and had 3.5–4.7-inch frontal armor, along with a remarkable 3.5-inch side armor. The JS III weighed an additional 1.5 tons but was two mph faster. It had an exceptional 4.7–6.0 inches of frontal armor. Some 2,300 “Stalin” tanks were built in 1944, and 1,500 in 1945.

TANK ARMY

A Red Army equivalent to a Wehrmacht armored corps, or Panzerkorps . It was a new formation introduced in 1942 after three failed prewar and early wartime experiments: four enormous prewar “tank corps” were broken up in 1939; reorganization of tank brigades was tried in 1940; a dismal try out of mechanized corps failed during 1941. Command and organizational problems troubled many tank armies to the end of 1943. It was only in 1944 and 1945 that the Red Army began to resolve these problems and employ its tank armies to excellent operational effect.

MECHANIZED CORPS (MC)

An early Red Army formation comprising two armored divisions and one motorized rifle division. This organization did not survive major reforms undertaken from mid-1941 even while fighting against the German invader. Judged by the Stavka to have been too large and difficult to handle in combat, MCs were replaced over 1942 by more heavily armored tank brigades, formed in turn into tank corps and tank armies. Tank companies were also added to rifle divisions. 

MECHANIZED DIVISION (MD)

A Red Army designation for hastily organized mobile armor forces assembled, but only partly equipped and trained, in the year before the German BARBAROSSA invasion of the Soviet Union began on June 22, 1941. Along with similarly poorly designed and commanded motorized rifle divisions, almost all mechanized divisions were destroyed in the first six months of fighting, losing nearly all their tanks and tracked vehicles. All but two of the original 27 MDs were converted into tank brigades and tank armies in reforms initiated by the Stavka in early 1942.