Ost 1942 Command Failure

At senior command level, trends at OKW and OKH ran counter to those at STAVKA. Where Stalin began to appreciate the limitations of his military expertise, Hitler, from an initial position of mere arbiter of strategy, became increasingly involved in tactical decision-making. From his order of December 1941 for Army Group Centre to stand fast, and his decision to dismiss `defeatist' commanders, he concluded that he above all had the wisdom and the will to force a final victory. From his decision that II Corps should hold fast at Demyansk, and the subsequent successful defence of the pocket, he concluded that large formations of encircled German troops could be adequately supplied by the Luftwaffe while continuing to pose a significant threat to the enemy rear. After the resignation of Brauchitsch on 19 December 1941 Hitler assumed the post of Commander in Chief OKH thereby eliminating the army's last vestige of service independence. Thereafter he began to appoint politically loyal generals to senior command positions, and increasingly he began to micromanage combat operations. In doing so he undermined one of the strengths of the German army, the delegated authority of commanders on the battlefield to make independent command decisions and their ability to respond flexibly to changes in operational circumstances. 

Having anticipated a conflict of around eight weeks duration, prior to 1942 there had been little planning by the German High Command for a prolonged conflict. Weapon development projects during 1941 had been scaled back or cancelled and virtually no preparation had been made for the possibility of the conflict continuing into the depths of a Russian winter. Yet having faced a larger, better-equipped and more resilient foe than it had anticipated, as the winter of 1941 approached OKH found that it was facing an enemy whose morale was still unbroken, that was, unlike the Ostheer, fully equipped for winter fighting, and that was adapting its tactics in light of bitter experience. An example of evolving Soviet tactics was the clash that took place between Eberbach's 5 Pz Bgd and Katukov's 4 Tank Bgd southwest of Mtsensk in October 1941. Katukov concentrated his force and used advantages of surprise, terrain and armament range to good effect. Clashes of this sort prompted the Wehrmacht to revive pre-war plans for the development of a heavy tank, and for the development of a new medium tank that could emulate the combat capability of the T34. Until such new weapons could be both developed and produced in quantity, the Ostheer would be left to fight using tanks designed in the 1930s. 

Fortunately for Germany, in the PzKpfw Mk IV it had a machine that was capable of extensive development in its power train, its armament and its armour. During its development the Mk IV became the backbone of the panzer forces, and for a time gave the Ostheer a renewed qualitative edge. The Mk III was too small and too light for such major upgrading, but there remained an urgent requirement for thicker armour and an improved gun. The most immediate improvement to the Mk III and the Mk IV was a doubling of their armour protection through the fitting of face-hardened spaced plates, and the acceptance of a consequent reduction in their mobility. The Mk IV was up gunned through the replacement of its short-barrelled 7.5cm infantry support weapon with a highly effective 43-calibre variant of the new 7.5cm anti-tank gun. The Mk III was not capable of taking the 7.5cm anti-tank gun, but its armament was improved somewhat by the replacement of its 42-calibre 5cm gun with a variant of the long-barrelled (60-calibre) 5cm Pak 38 (L/60) anti-tank gun that was being issued to the infantry. The deficiencies of the infantry's standard 3.7cm anti-tank gun had been recognised since 1940. Though light and manoeuvrable, it was almost useless in dealing with the T34 and KV1 and was a factor in the rout of 112 Inf Div by part of 32 Tank Bgd supported by 239 Rifle Div southeast of Tula in November 1941. In response, the process, begun in 1940, of replacing the infantry's 3.7cm gun with the Pak 38 (L/60) was accelerated. Also available was a variant of the 7.5cm anti-tank gun developed for infantry use (the Pak 40). Although the 7.5cm was an effective weapon it was too heavy to be manoeuvred manually and had to be towed into position by motorised transport, severely limiting its operational flexibility. The highly effective 8.8cm dual-purpose anti-aircraft and anti-tank gun was even more unwieldy, and at 4.4 tonnes was nearly ten times the weight of the early 3.7cm gun. In 1940 the Wehrmacht had begun the development of the self-propelled gun, a turretless armoured fighting vehicle based on the chassis of a tank with a gun fitted to a fixed casement. Such weapons generally had a lower profile than a tank, were easier and cheaper to manufacture and, depending on their configuration, could be used as mobile indirect fire artillery, as direct fire infantry support weapons, or as `tank-killers'. In the direct fire infantry support assault gun role, Germany developed in 1940 the StuG III based on the PzKpfw Mk III chassis and armed with the short-barrelled 7.5cm infantry support gun. In the same year the Panzerjäger I, the first `tank-killer' self-propelled gun, was developed based on the PzKpfw Mk I tank chassis and armed with a 4.7cm Pak(t) gun. These weapons were the first of a range of increasingly powerful self-propelled guns developed by Germany during the course of the war. 

The main weapons of the German artillery arm were developed in the early 1930s. At regimental level, two infantry support guns predominated - the short-barrelled 7.5cm leIG18 and the somewhat cumbersome 15cm sIG33. At divisional level, artillery support was based primarily on the 10.5cm sK18 field gun, the 10.5cm leFH18 howitzer and the 15cm sFH18 heavy howitzer. In the early period of the war these artillery pieces, used in conjunction with the German army's efficient and effective fire control system, proved to be eminently fit for purpose, and they were subject to little further development. The leFH18 was upgraded in 1941 to achieve a modest increase in range, and to improve the range of the sFH18, the ammunition for the gun was modified to provide a rocket propulsion element to the shell's propellant system. The German army had a range of larger calibre artillery pieces (15cm and above), and significant use was made of captured guns, but the mainstay of the artillery arm remained the regimental and divisional artillery weapons with which Germany went to war in 1939. 

As a means of countering the improved armour protection of tanks, in conjunction with the introduction of faster and heavier anti-tank projectiles, considerable development went into the design of the projectiles. The first improvement from the simple solid shot was the addition of a softer metallic cap to prevent the break-up of the armour penetrating component on impact. Further improvements were achieved by the use of tungsten carbide in the main shot, and the streamlining of the shot to achieve higher muzzle velocities by the fitting of a ballistic cap to the impact cap. Such developments were pursued by both sides during the early period of the war and the result of this work had a considerable impact on force structure and tactics as the war progressed. 

In the air, both sides strove to improve the performance of their aircraft, neither side gaining a distinct technological advantage. The Red Army took some time to recover from the devastating aircraft losses of the first few days of the war, but in a combat zone as large as the Eastern Front neither side would ever achieve true air superiority. All that could be achieved was local and often merely temporary advantage on a particular strategic axis.

Panthers at Kursk

The Frontline Illustration book called: ‘Panthers at Kursk’ (roughly translated) - the following is new according to the book:

a. The 52nd Abt. used different company colours for its snarling panther head logos. 5th Company had white head with black details, 6th blue head with white details, 7th black head with white details and the 8th a brown head with black and white details, as well as a red tongue. The head of the 8th company also differs in details. The photos included are clear enough to support the theory of different colours, but the blue one is difficult to proof.

b. The book is suggesting the following numbering system: R01-R08, I01-I08, II01-II08 and then x01-x02, x11-x15, x21-x25, x31-x35 and x41-x45 for the eight tank companies. This is supported with photos of R04, 101, 121, 142, 144, 214, 231, 312, 432, 434, 445, 502, 521, 535, 613, 632, 633, 634, 732, 735, 745 and 824.

c. There are a number of clear shots showing R04, and it has no logo.

d. The prowling panther in black outline is said to have been used by the 51st Abt. when it was serving with Grossdeutschland after Kursk. There are shots of Panthers 102, 124, 211, 301, 322 and 445, all showing this logo. The one numbered “4” in the earlier thread is probably the one said to be 124 here. The shot shows “24” with the one being added in the caption. Of further interest is that at least 102 and 445 has the first style turret with the “Klappe” on the LHS of the turret.

e. The table with cause-of-demise for Panthers is also given here. It is for tanks KO between the 20th and 28th of June 1943. The interesting thing is that the following turret numbers are given in this: 95, 170, 281, 381, 440, 551. They do not fit into the suggested numbering system proposed in this book, and it is also clearly stated. None of these "odd ones" appears in the photos, only tanks that fit in.

As to the odd turret numbers listed, it may well be that they were guessed from remains of burnt-out Panthers. Perhaps a bit shaky explanation, but at least a possible one.

The panther head logo of the 8th company actually appears to be in the some brown shade as the normal camo brown. It may be that it is a transparent logo, which would also explain the additional details.

Panther Brigade 10 at Kursk - Redux

There was a huge catfight after Kursk as to Pz Brig 10's notable lack of success. Everyone was screaming about how the Panthers hadn't worked. Decker[1] blamed Strachwitz's tactics, because his own rear end was very much on the line. Decker was not with his unit from 7-11 July, being called to account to Knobelsdorff (XXXXVII Pzkps) for the brigade staff's lack of effectiveness, and thus had a fine opportunity to blame Strachwitz and Hoernlein for all the problems. His letter drips self-justification, conveniently ignoring a few facts, such as the loss of about 150 of the 200 Panthers in the attacks on 5-6 July, when Decker was in command. Most of the confusion regarding terrain, Pakfronts and minefields resulted from the Panther units having arrived at the last minute and conducted no reconnaissance, many of their officers' inexperience, and radio equipment deficiencies. The "idiocy" of Strachwitz's tactics also may be judged by the fact that at the end of 6 July, Pz Rgt GD, which had been out front both days, had suffered far fewer losses than had Pz Brig 10. The reality was that GD with Pz Brig 10 attached undertook its mission exactly in accordance with its orders and current Panzer doctrine. The sad fact was that the panzerwaffe had never encountered a defense in depth of the sort found in the Korps AO. Doctrine until then had called for slashing tactics, ignoring flanks. The changes to doctrine reflected lessons learned generally, not any fault in Pz Rgt GD. Of course, doctrine for offensive operations of the Kursk sort wasn't used much thereafter. Strachwitz was very much the aristocrat and could be forbidding to deal with. He also remained adept at aggressive Panzer tactics, leading to his repeated tasking to pocket-relief missions until the war's end. Anyone wondering just how widely he was regarded as "idiotic" should search (in vain) for other criticism of him like Decker's, and consider his and his critic's respective career paths after Kursk. The confusion that's arisen over this question is just another example of the deficiencies inherent in Jentz's approach in Panzertruppen. Apparently uncomfortable with his analytical abilities, he declines any analysis whatsoever. This would not present so many problems if he weren't so selective in the primary sources he quotes and paraphrases, and if his readers generally were a little more historiographically sophisticated. By the way, I found the Decker letter at p 96 of Panzertruppen 2, and the info on Pz Brig 10's late arrival and the losses on 5-6 July are at pp 114 et seq of Jung's Pzrgt GD book.

Both abteilungen [battalions] abtn retained a cadre or kernel of very experienced crews. However, they were filled out with inexperienced people, many with no panzer experience at all, and were subject to some personnel "raiding" during their long sojourn in Germany during the Panther teething period. Officer quality in the two abtn was very uneven. Because the brigade's Panthers only were shipped at the eleventh hour, many of the crews had very slim experience with the new vehicle; bear in mind that a minimal number of Panthers had been issued for training, and they all experienced very high downtime from teething problems. More important, perhaps, there had been very little work at zug [platoon] level and none on a larger scale. Many of the abtn personnel arrived in the kampfraum only a day or so before the offensive began; the brigade staff showed up even later. Thus there was very little of the usual foot recon, signals testing, etc. that doctrine stated should precede a deliberate attack. While a veteran unit might have improved on the brig's performance in the almost-hasty attack circumstances faced on 5-7 July, and veteran crews doubtless maneuverered and fought well, subject to mechanical problems and the unexpected defenses, the brigade as a whole charitably could be said to have been still shaking down at Kursk. It would be interesting to know how the brig's performance improved over the campaign. Presumably experienced crews made fewer disabling errors (a major reason for engine failure was said to be inexperienced driving, and presumably green crews made more tactical mistakes and paid for them); I wonder to what extent veteran crews that lost their rides ranked others out of their panzers. These two factors likely shrank the brig into a much smaller but more effective unit. The brigade's problems in training, equipping and transport, and the resulting difficulties in their first engagements, are recounted in Jentz and in the Spaeter and Jung GD books ( I recall that Feist and some other secondary published sources selectively synopsize the information.) Of course, it's necessary to read with the filters on, as all the first-hand reports were written to assign or deflect blame for the brigade's problems, but many assertions appear factual and unequivocal, and rough triangulation towards an assessment is possible.

There were a three instances of German Panzer brigades getting thrashed in Lorraine in the fall of 1944. And the typical cry of "Jabos" doesn't begin to explain what happened. The Germans were outmaneuvered and outfought, twice by American troops of Patton's army; and in the third instance by the French 2nd AD.

In these three instances the common denominator was the lack of experience of the Panzer troops. This charge can even be made against their senior leadership -- for while they were experts in armored warfare on the eastern front, they were ill-prepared to fight on the western front of 1944.

Certainly tanks were abandoned by their crews during these fights and certainly some of these were cases of panic. But, a small set of instances like these is hardly justification to intimate on a broad scale that Heer panzer crews were cowardly or untrained. All the actions in this case prove is that less well trained and experienced troops will generally not do well against a better trained and experienced enemy. This was proved again in January 1945, when the shoe was on the other foot, and it was the green U.S. 12th Armored Division learning harsh lessons in and around Herrlisheim.

[1]Lauchert lead the 39th Panzer Regiment (the Panthers). Decker lead the 10th Panzer Brigade, which was supposed to consist of the 39th Panzer Regiment and the Gross Deutschland Panzer Regiment. This arrangement lasted for two days in combat (5th and 6th), before Decker was relieved and command of these two regiments were placed under command of the GD Panzer Regiment commander (von Strachwitz). After von Strachwitz was injured on the 10th, Decker took back over command of the two regiments.