The Moscow offensive persevered with the
two-pronged attacks inaugurated by General Zhukov in December. To the north,
two Soviet armies attacked toward Demyansk and three more armies attacked
toward Belev to the south and east. These drives by 76 divisions quickly
produced a large irregular bulge in the German lines and threatened to isolate
the German Ninth Army in the Rzhev area. To the south of Moscow, even larger
Soviet forces struck due west in the general direction of Smolensk, but here
the going was tougher. Surrounded German units expertly formed circular
hedgehog defenses to protect themselves against attack from any direction. They
held their ground and kept busy Soviet units that otherwise could have advanced
farther to the west and south.
Week after week, continuous fighting raged
the length and breadth of the enormous Moscow front. The battles were
particularly fierce in the north around Demyansk, Kholm and Staraya Russa; if
Soviet forces broke through there, they might link up with armies that began
attacking southward from the Leningrad sector on January 13. Red Army units did
penetrate to the center of Staraya Russa, blowing up ammunition dumps and
reducing the ancient trading post to rubble. But the German 2nd Corps, surrounded
in a 20-by-40-mile hedgehog between Demyansk and Kholm, held out through a
two-and-a-half-month siege with the aid of supplies flown in by the Luftwaffe.
Soviet forces, too, were surrounded in
great swirling battles around Vyazma, in the center of the Moscow front between
the two enormous pincers. The Germans cut off General P. A. Belov's cavalry
corps and three divisions of the Thirty-third Army under Lieut. General M. G.
Yefremov. For weeks the Russians hung on and fought back. Belov's horsemen
finally sliced through to Soviet lines, but Yefremov and most of his men were
blocked at every turn. Severely wounded and facing capture, Yefremov shot
himself.
Elsewhere, the Soviet attacks fared poorly.
The armies in the Leningrad sector failed to break through to the besieged
city, and one army was surrounded on boggy terrain to the south. Far to the
south of the Moscow front, Soviet forces did manage to drive a salient into the
German lines near Izyum, but they could advance no farther and were left in a
dangerously exposed position. At the extreme southern end of the front, Soviet
forces attempted to relieve German pressure on besieged Sevastopol by making an
amphibious assault on the nearby Kerch Peninsula jutting out into the Black
Sea. The expedition proved to be a costly failure. The Sevastopol garrison
attempted to break out of the encircling German lines, but it too came a
cropper.
Nevertheless, Stalin stopped at nothing to
keep his offensives going. He juggled his commanders and shifted whole armies
about, sometimes for no apparent purpose. On the Moscow front, he deprived
Zhukov of the First Shock Army just when the general needed it most, and only
to place it in reserve. Zhukov objected vigorously, saying that he had
earmarked that army for his attack toward Vyazma . "Don't protest,"
Stalin retorted. "Send it along. You have plenty of troops-just count
them."
And so it was that, in late February,
Stalin's much-vaunted general offensive ran out of steam and presently ground
to a halt, just as reasonable Soviet officers had said it would on January 5.
The Red Army had won isolated chunks of relatively unimportant terrain and had
been gravely weakened in the process. General Zhukov indulged himself a dry
recapitulation: "Stalin was very attentive to advice but, regrettably,
sometimes took decisions not in accord with the situation." Yet the
winter campaign had not been much of a victory for the Germans either. German
casualties amounted to nearly 200,000 men, and only by dint of skilful and
courageous fighting had Hitler's Wehrmacht been able to hold in roughly the
same position that the generals had hoped to occupy in the strategic withdrawal
forbidden by the Führer.
This fact, of course, escaped Hitler's
notice. He heartily agreed with Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, who put
out word that "the Führer alone
saved the Eastern Front this winter." Goebbels noted credulously in his
diary, "The Führer described to me
how close we were to a Napoleonic winter. Had he weakened for one moment, the
front would have caved in a catastrophe that would have put the Napoleonic
disaster far into the shade.”
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