Second Kharkov remains one of the most controversial battles
of the war in Soviet and Russian historiography. Blame for another catastrophic
defeat of the Red Army was laid on Joseph Stalin by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956,
after the great dictator’s death. Marshals Boris M. Shaposhnikov and Semyon
Timoshenko and their immediate subordinates have been blamed by others, with
Stalin in a supporting role. The origins of the controversy lie in the fact
that, despite massive losses suffered in 1941 and again over the first four
months of 1942, Stalin and some members of the Stavka insisted on fresh spring
offensives all along the Eastern Front. Among these operations, the most
important turned into the disastrous Second Battle of Kharkov. Timoshenko
pushed especially hard for this fight. General Georgi Zhukov and some other
Stavka members seem to have opposed an unwise dispersal of sparse forces among
too many, and also overly ambitious, operations. A compromise was reached by
limiting the operation in eastern Ukraine to a push to retake Kharkov, which
was held by German 6th Army under General Friedrich Paulus. It was
simultaneously proposed to straighten the line and protect the Barvenkovo
salient southeast of Kharkov. Meanwhile, the Germans were planning their own
Operation FRIDERICUS, a limited offensive intended to trap Soviet forces in the
“Izium pocket,” or “Barvenkovo salient.” Neither side knew the others’ plans.
Soviet military intelligence failed to detect the German offensive intention to
cut off the Barvenkovo salient and additionally fell victim to a German
deception campaign that effectively concealed the Barvenkovo build-up.
Each side was about equal in numbers of men and guns
involved as the battle was engaged. The Soviets moved first, though not well or
fast. Many of the more than 1,100 Soviet tanks at Kharkov were in newly
organized and still experimental formations. Formed into two armored pincers,
they reached deep into the German defenses. The first pincer was a strong
formation of three armies from Southwestern Front that attacked on either side
of Kharkov on May 12. Soviet 6th Army formed a smaller pincer that struck
farther south, directly out of the Barvenkovo salient. Within five days, Soviet
6th Army ran into the planned FRIDERICUS attack, which was strongly supported
by Panzers and by the Luftwaffe. The Germans achieved complete surprise, as
General Ewald von Kleist sliced into the thinned southern flank and rear of the
still-advancing Soviet 6th Army. The left pincer of the Soviet Kharkov
operation was thus forced to reverse, fighting desperately to return to its
jump-off positions in the Barvenkovo salient in an effort to prevent being
totally cut off. The fighting retreat by Soviet 6th Army was delayed by lack of
timely orders from the Stavka or from Timoshenko. Some 20 divisions and
thousands of guns and tanks were thus encircled by the Germans on May 23, as
Kleist closed the trap around a Soviet force that had advanced directly into
it. Very heavy fighting followed in another great Kessel, which cooked to death
all Soviet 6th Army. Loss of the southern Soviet pincer eviscerated the effect
of any advance farther north, around the city. Worse, vast losses of men and
matériel opened a wide gap in the Soviet line. Through that gap, Paulus and
German 6th Army pushed their advantage later that summer, along what turned out
to be a deadly, one-way road to Stalingrad.
Much of the controversy about the Soviet failure at Second
Kharkov attends the delay in ordering a pullback by Soviet 6th Army. More
attention might be usefully paid to the lack of Red Army mobility even with a
large tank force at hand, and to the readiness with which large numbers of Red
Army conscripts still surrendered, as they had done during 1941. The Red Army
lost at Kharkov not merely because of intelligence and command failures, but
more fundamentally because it was still bleeding men and machines that operated
with overly blunt tactics, and because it had yet to recover fighting morale:
as many as 214,000 krasnoarmeets gave up the fight at Kharkov. As for the
Wehrmacht, while its military intelligence showed its usual inability to
penetrate Soviet planning, its field commanders again displayed superior
operational command and control and its field units performed with remarkable
mobility and better basic fighting skill than their opponents. That disparity
in battle performance would remain into late 1942, and even to mid-1943.
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