The rasputitsa refers to the biannual seasons when unpaved roads
become difficult to traverse in parts of Belarus, Russia and
Ukraine. The word may be translated as the "quagmire season"
because during this period the large flatlands become extremely
muddy and marshy, as do most unpaved roads. The term applies to
both the "spring rasputitsa" and "autumn rasputitsa" and to the
condition of the roads during those seasons. The rasputitsa occurs
more strongly in the spring due to the melting snow but it usually
recurs in the fall due to frequent heavy rains.
The rasputitsa seasons of Russia are well known as a great
defensive advantage in wartime. Napoleon found the mud in Russia to
be a very great hindrance in 1812. During the Second World War the
month-long muddy period slowed down the German advance during the
Battle of Moscow, and may have helped save the Soviet capital, as
well as the presence of "General Winter", that followed the autumn
rasputitsa period.
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Von Weichs's 2 Army was still clearing up the area of the
encircled Bryansk Front near the Desna and had been left far behind
the spearhead of the advance and out of touch with the main enemy.
In the second week in October 1941, the clearing operations having
been completed, its three infantry corps began their long march
eastwards through the streaming rain and mud. The men were
exhausted after the break-in battles and mopping-up operations near
Bryansk, but there was no question of giving them even a few days'
rest. Pursuit eastwards was the order of the day. Tired and
verminous and soaked to the skin, boots and socks never dry, the
infantry trudged slowly southeast from Bryansk along the Orel
highway.
Infantry was the only arm capable of moving by its own efforts,
even though this movement was hardly eight miles a day. With its
few possessions on its back it moved itself, fed itself and
quartered itself by living off the land, improved its own tracks
and built its own light bridges. Not only did it march, but it
found the willing hands which pulled the horses out of mud-filled
shell holes and gullies, and provided the heaving backs which got
the ditched wagon wheels turning again; yet without the horse the
infantry itself would have been lost.
Most roads and tracks had disappeared and those remaining were
so few in number that several divisions were allocated to a single
route, this congestion slowing down the rate of march. No wheeled
motor vehicles accompanied the columns. Although the progress of
the dismounted men was painfully slow, that of the horses in
harness was even slower. In the end the infantry companies were
ordered on ahead and they left behind them the vehicle-loaded
stores, heavy radio and ammunition and the horse-drawn anti-tank
guns and artillery. Fleeter of foot, they began to overtake other
units and formations, no further effort being made to keep to a
march table, so that regiments and divisions became mixed and
broken up.
The hamlets through which the columns passed were crammed with
German troops; too often the towns and bigger villages had been
destroyed in the fighting or gutted by the local inhabitants, who
looted all materials and fixtures which could possibly be carried
off. For the most part the troops remained out at night in the rain
and the cold; sleep was out of the question. Although movement was
not delayed by the enemy or by mines, it took von Weichs's marching
infantry formations fourteen days to cover 125 miles. Even then,
most of the equipment had been left behind.
By 26 October, when the van of 2 Army had reached the area
between Mtsensk and Kursk, it was directed to thrust on Efremov,
Elets and the area north of Voronezh. Von Weichs, having crossed
Guderian's lines of communication from left to right, was moving
away from him and could no longer cover the 2 Panzer Army right
flank.
Immediately to the north of von Weichs's 2 Army, 52 German
Infantry Division moved near the inter-army boundary towards Kaluga
on the far southern flank of von Kluge's 4 Army. The formation had
started from Sukhinichi, leaving the forest belt behind it, when,
on 13 October, the rains began in earnest. The general service army
carts were ditched because they were slung too low, and Russian
farm vehicles were seized from the fields. The loads which could
not be carried forward were abandoned and the remaining horses
pooled in order to provide spare teams. Only two light guns in each
battery were taken on, together with their limbers, each piece
being dragged forward by ten horses, while the unharnessed animals
brought up the rear.
Within two days the horses, up to the knees and sometimes the
girths in mud, had lost their shoes, but in the soft going could
manage without them. The infantrymen, whose calf boots were
frequently sucked from their legs as they waded on, knee deep in
water, were not so fortunate. Their boots were already in pieces.
After the first day's march the horse-drawn guns and baggage, light
though it was, could not keep up with the men, and the troops went
rationless except for the tea and potatoes looted from the farms.
No longer could they rely on the support of the gun and mortar in
clearing up enemy resistance.
Unwittingly, they longed for the coming of the front and the
winter.
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